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ABSTRACT 
Empirical studies on happiness have found that: a) most people are happy in modern 
nations, b) average happiness in nations is rising, c) inequality in happiness is going 
down, d) happiness depends heavily on the kind of society one lives in, but e) not very 
much on one’s place in society. These remarkable findings are largely ignored in 
sociology, if not denied. This has several reasons. One reason is professional bias: most 
sociologists earn their living dealing with social problems are therefore not apt to see 
that people flourish. Another reason is ideological: many sociologists are ‘critical’ of 
modern society and can therefore hardly imagine that people thrive in these conditions. 
Lastly, some sociological theories play them false, in particular cognitive theories 
implying that happiness is relative. These theories and the evidence against them are 
discussed in this paper.  
 
 
1 FINDINGS ON HAPPINESS 
 
Happiness has long been a playground for speculative philosophy, but since the 1970s it 
has also become the subject of empirical research. In that research, happiness is 
conceived as overall life-satisfaction and measured using self-reports. This conception of 
happiness has appeared to be sound and this way of measurement has been proven valid 
(Veenhoven, 1984, Diener 1999). This research tradition has yielded a growing body of 
knowledge, much is which is gathered in the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 
2007). There are four main findings: 
 
Most people are happy 
The earliest investigations on happiness took place in modern western nations and 
observed that most people were happy. This appeared not only in responses to questions 
about life satisfaction, but also in various measures of daily mood, such as the Bradburn 
(1969) Affect Balance Scale.  An example is presented in figure 1, in which the 
distribution of responses to the following question in the World Values Survey 1999 in 
the EU member states is shown. 
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All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as-a-whole these days? 
                 1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9          10 
Dissatisfied                                                                                           satisfied 
 
Only 17% of the population in these countries rated 5 or lower on this question while no 
less than 54% rated their life 8 or higher. The reports may be somewhat inflated by 
desirability, but this bias appears to be marginal. The validity of these measures is beyond 
doubt. People understand the concept and typically answer such questions properly. 
Responses are not so positive in all countries of the world, but still the average is above 
neutral in most of day’s nations. This can be seen in figure 2, in which the distribution of 
average scores in nations is presented. Of the 95 nations in this comparison, only 19 score 
5 or lower, while average happiness is 7 or higher in 25 nations 
 
Average happiness is rising 
Since the 1970s happiness has been periodically assessed in most western nations. 
Comparison over time shows an upward trend in most of these nations. See figure 3. 
Trend data on non-western nations are less abundant, but show greater gains in happiness 
over this period (Veenhoven, 2006, table 2). Life-expectancy has also risen considerably 
in this era and this means that this generation has witnessed an unprecedented rise in 
‘happy life years’. Americans gained 5,2 happy life-years between 1973 and 2003 and 
Western Europeans about 7 happy life years. We live now longer and happier than ever 
before in human history (Veenhoven 2005). 
 
Inequality in happiness going down 
This rise in average happiness has been accompanied by a reduction of the dispersion of 
happiness in the general public, which manifests in a lowering of standard deviations 
over time. This reduction is partly due to the rising average that causes a concentration of 
responses at the top of the scale, but not entirely. The lowering of inequality in happiness 
is also due to a reduction in unhappy responses. (See figure 4) 
        
Strong impact of kind of society 
Average happiness differs widely across nations (cf. Figure 2) and there appears to be a 
system in these differences. Happiness is systematically higher in nations that combine a 
good material standard of living with good governance, freedom and a climate of 
tolerance. See figure 5. Together, such societal characteristics explain about 75% of the 
differences in average happiness across nations (Ott 2005)  
There are also societal characteristics that appeared to be unrelated to average 
happiness of citizens. This is the case for income inequality in nations (Berg 2006) and 
for state welfare effort (Veenhoven 2000).  
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Little impact of place in society  
Several surveys on happiness have been done in the context of marketing research for the 
welfare state and aimed at identifying client groups. Investigators expected social 
deprivation to be accompanied by unhappiness, which would legitimize policy 
intervention. Yet they found little correlation between happiness and income position, 
happiness also appeared to be unrelated to the level of education of an individual. 
Together, social positional variables explain at best 10% of the differences in happiness 
found within nations. Happiness depends far more on embedding in intimate networks 
and on psychological characteristics (e.g. Headey & Wearing 1992). This is at least so in 
modern affluent nations. 
 
 
 
2 RECEPTION IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
There are good reasons to expect that these findings will attract considerable attention in 
sociology. One reason is that the subject was on the agenda of the 19th century founding 
fathers of sociology such as Auguste Comte (Ple 2000) and Herbert Spencer (1857).  
Another reason to expect arid interest is that these findings involve answers to 
long-standing questions in sociology, the finding that most people are happy is indicative 
of how livable modern society is; the finding that happiness is rising embodies an answer 
to the question of progress; the finding that inequality in happiness is going down is 
telling about the relevance of ‘new’ social inequalities and the finding that happiness 
differs so much across kinds of societies is highly relevant in the debate of what a good 
society is like.  
Still another reason to expect close attention is that some of the findings flatly 
contradict some common beliefs. The finding that inequality of happiness has diminished 
during the last decades contradicts the common notion of ‘new inequality’ arising in 
modern societies. Likewise the finding that income inequality in nations is unrelated to 
average happiness contradicts the commonly held belief that socio-economic disparities 
cause deep frustration. The same holds for the finding that income position within nations 
hardly affects happiness. 
Yet the reality is that these findings are not acknowledged in sociology. This 
appears in the following examples: 
 
Not mentioned in textbooks 
The subject of happiness is typically absent in sociological textbooks. For instance the 
word does not appear in the subject index of the introductory books by written by 
Giddens (2006), Marsh et al (1996) and Newman (1997). These books do mention 
negative mental states such as anomie and alienation and do contain sections on (ill) 
health. A notable exception is the introduction to macro-sociology by Nolan and Lensky 
(2006) where happiness is discussed in the context of social progress. 
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Missing in Dictionary of Sociology 
The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, 2nd edition, does not include happiness as a 
keyword, and neither subjective well-being nor quality-of-life (Johnson 2002) 
 
Marginal in sociological journals 
The subject of happiness is only rarely addressed in sociological journals. This appears 
from an analysis of the sociological abstracts. Until the year 2000 the subject was hardly 
mentioned at all and today the number of publications on this subject is still below 2% of 
the total. See figure 6. The bulk of these publications can be found in two niche journals: 
Social Indicators Research and the Journal of Happiness Studies. Happiness is still hardly 
mentioned in mainstream sociological journals. The subject gets more attention in 
psychology and recently also in economics.  
 
Missing in sociological discourse on ‘quality of life’ 
Still, the term ‘quality-of-life’ is not unknown in sociology. There are symposia under 
that name and also research institutes. Yet subjective enjoyment of life is typically not at 
stake in these contexts, quality-of-life being typically conceived as the degree to which 
life meets a-priory standards of wellbeing. The last (16th) world congress of sociology 
provides a nice illustration: the conference theme was: ‘The quality of social existence in 
a globalizing world’ and the issues discussed in this context were conditions deemed 
beneficial, such as social identity, social cohesion and social mobility. Subjective 
appreciation of life in these conditions was markedly absent from the thematic sessions of 
this conference. 
 
Lost in a preoccupation with misery 
As noted above, sociology deals with problems in the first place. This appears for 
instance in the use of the word ‘satisfaction’ in sociological abstracts; in 41% of the 
abstracts that word is used to denote a negative state, that is, dissatisfaction, while in only 
8% the word is used for a positive appreciation2.   
 Analysis of the sociological abstracts has also shown an increasing use of 
negative words such as ‘fear’ and  ’crime’ over the last decade (Elchardus 2005). This 
narrowing of the focus on misery contrasts with the above mentioned findings of rising 
levels of happiness in nations. 
 
 
3 REASONS FOR NEGLECT 
 
Why do sociologists overlook this matter? I see three kinds of reasons: pragmatic, 
ideological and theoretical.  
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To begin with pragmatic reasons: sociologists are more interested in what people 
do than in how they feel. Their main objective is to explain social behavior and happiness 
is at best a variable in that context. A related point is that sociology is about collectivities, 
while happiness is an individual level concept.  A further pragmatic reason is that 
sociologists earn their living dealing with social problems. So, if they look at subjective 
well being at all, they focus on ill being in the first place3.  
Next there are ideological reasons. Many sociologists are committed to notions of 
objective wellbeing, such as social equality and social cohesion. They are therefore not 
eager to investigate how people actually feel in such conditions, and when they do, they 
often ignore contradictory results. For instance, when people appear to feel subjectively 
good in conditions deemed to be objectively bad, this is easily disposed of as 'desirability 
bias' or ‘false consciousness'.  
Lastly, there are theoretical reasons. Sociologists tend to think of happiness as a 
mere idea that depends on social comparison with variable standards and that is, 
therefore, a whimsical state of mind, not worth pursuing and hence not worth studying. 
Below I will consider these views in more detail. 
Sociologists are not specialized in matters of the mind, but still make 
psychological assumptions. They typically borrow from cognitive psychology, probably 
because that line of thought fits with their view on man as a socially determined being. In 
this line, sociologists see happiness as a cognitive ‘construct’ shaped by collective 
notions of the good life and as the result of comparisons, social comparison in particular. 
 
Presumed social construction of happiness 
Social construction theory is about how we make sense of things. It assumes that we 
'construct' mental representations, using collective notions as building blocks. Social 
constructionism stresses human thinking and is blind for affective experience and innate 
drives.  
In this view, happiness is regarded as a social construction, comparable to notions 
like 'beauty' and 'fairness'. A common reasoning in this line is that happiness depends on 
shared notions about life and that these collective notions frame individual appraisals.  
One of the ways this is assumed to work is seeing the glass half full or half empty, 
optimistic cultures tending to highlight the positive aspects of life, while pessimistic 
cultures emphasize its shortcomings. Americans have been mentioned as an example of 
the former view and the French of the latter, e.g. by Ostroot & Scheider (1985). In this 
line Inglehart (1990:30) has suggested that happiness is lower in France than in the US 
because life was harder in France for earlier generations, and this is echoed in a more 
pessimistic outlook on life today.   
Another cognitive mechanism assumed to gear happiness is comparison with 
shared notions of the good life. In this view, happiness is the gap between perceptions of 
life-as-it -is with notions of how-life-should-be. In this line it is commonly argued that 
the advertising industry reduces our wellbeing, because it fosters dreams of a life that is 
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out of reach for the common man (Layard 2005). Another example of this view is the 
claim that the high levels of happiness in modern nations result from giving up hope for a 
better life.. 
An additional mechanism that has been mentioned is that we see ourselves 
typically though the eyes of others and hence also judge our happiness though their eyes. 
In this view, happiness is a 'reflected appraisal'. We will be positive about our life when 
people around us deem us to be well off and negative when others see us as losers. In this 
vein the lower happiness among singles has been explained as the result of a negative 
stereotype: because singles are 'labeled' as pitiful they come to see themselves as 
miserable, in spite of the apparent advantages of single living (e.g. Davies & Strong 
1977).   
The constructionist view implies that there is little value to happiness, happiness 
being a mere idea. Since notions about the good life vary across time and culture, 
happiness is also seen to be culturally relative. A life that is deemed perfect in one idea of 
the good life may be seen to be a failure from perspective. For this reason this theory is 
popular among the critics of Bentham’s (1789) moral philosophy, i.e. that we should aim 
at “greater happiness for a greater number”; it reduces happiness to something 
insignificant. 
 
Theoretical plausibility 
It is beyond doubt that shared notions frame much of our appraisals, yet this is not to say 
that all awareness is socially constructed. We need no shared notions to experience pain 
or hunger; culture at best modifies our reflection on these experiences somewhat. Our 
understanding draws also on external stimuli and on inner signals. The question thus is:  
How does this work in the case of happiness? 
 When striking the balance of their life, people appear to use their mood as the 
prime source of information (Schwartz & Strack 1991) and consequently overall 
happiness correlates typically stronger with hedonic level of affect than with 
contentment. This appears from an analysis of correlational findings in the World 
Database of Happiness (WDH 2007, section H 6). There is logic in this, since the affect 
system is evolutionary older and serves to ascertain that an organism’s basic needs are 
met. The cognitive system developed on top of this in home sapiens, but it has not 
replaced the affective system. It is rather an additional device that allows better learning 
from experience and planning of activities. In this light it is unlikely that happiness is 
merely due to cognitive appraisal.  
 
Empirical support 
The reality value of this view cannot be tested as such, because the human mind is still a 
black box. Yet we can check its aptness indirectly, when we consider the implications of 
the theory that happiness is a mere social construction. 
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Culture specific?  
One implication is that conditions for happiness will be variable across cultures. If 
happiness is a culture specific construct, its determinants will also be culturally specific. 
Hence empirical studies on correlates of happiness must show considerable cultural 
variation and hardly any universal pattern. Yet the available data show otherwise. 
Comparison of average happiness across nations reveals a common pattern. Happiness is 
systematically higher in nations that provide a decent material standard of living, that are 
politically democratic and well governed and where the cultural climate is characterized 
by trust and tolerance. Together objective societal characteristics explain about 75% of 
the differences in happiness across nations (Veenhoven & Kalmijn 2005). Comparison of 
correlations within nations also shows much similarity. In all countries, the married 
appear to be happier than singles (Diener, 2000) and health is also a strong correlate of 
happiness all over the world, both physical health and mental health. See correlational 
findings on Physical health (section P 6) and Mental health (section M 7) in WDH 2007. 
Likewise, the differences in happiness across age and gender are typically small 
everywhere. See correlational findings on happiness and Age (section A 4) and Gender 
(section G 1) in WDH 2007.   
 
Variable over time?  
A second implication is that happiness must be variable over time. If happiness depends 
on shared notions of the good life, it will vary with fads about that matter and this must 
be reflected in erratic movements in average happiness in nations, comparable to changes 
in political preferences and tastes for music. Yet again this not what the data show. 
Average happiness appears to be very stable over time, at least in western nations over 
the last 30 years, where happiness has risen slightly without many fluctuations 
(Veenhoven 2006c). Follow-up studies at the individual level also show considerable 
constancy over time (Erhardt et. al. 2000). 
 
Inconsequential?  
A third implication is that happiness is of little consequence. If happiness is sheer 
cognitive spin, based on fashionable ideas, it will not matter much whether it pans out 
positively or negatively. Happiness is then a petty appraisal, such as a person’s preference 
for one kind of wallpaper or another; nice in itself but of no consequence for anything 
more than that.  
Once more, this appears not to be the case. Happiness appears to go hand in hand 
with objective thriving and follow-up studies have shown that happiness is a strong 
predictor of physical health and longevity (e.g. Danner et. al 2000, Veenhoven 2007b) 
  
Together, these findings do not support the theory that happiness is a mere making of the 
mind. 
Ruut Veenhoven 7 Sociology's blind eye for happiness
Note that these findings concern happiness-as-such, and not opinions about what 
adds to happiness. Happiness-as-such is something that we experience ourselves and 
which we can appraise without the help of others. Though we know how we feel, we 
often do not know why and in attributing grounds for our wellbeing we draw more on a 
shared view. In this respect happiness is comparable to a headache: a headache-as-such is 
not a social construction, it is an autonomous signal from the body. Yet our 
interpretations of what gives us a headache depend very much on hearsay.  
 
Wellbeing as surpassing the Jones 
All sociologists learn in their student days about the exemplary case of ‘relative 
deprivation’ described in Stouffer's (1949) classic study ‘The American Soldier’. One of 
the things assessed in this study is the satisfaction with promotion chances and contrary 
to expectation the satisfaction with this aspect of army life appeared to be higher in units 
where promotion chances were low, such as the military police, than in units where 
promotion chances were high, such as the air force. This phenomenon was explained in 
terms of social comparison; because promotion was more common in the air force, air 
force personnel more often felt they were entitled to promotion. This case of satisfaction 
with promotion makes many sociologists think that all satisfaction depends on social 
comparison. 
Social comparison theory is a variant of a wider comparison theory that links up 
with the above mentioned notion that happiness is the difference between life-as-it-is and 
how-life-should-be. The smaller these discrepancies are, the higher the happiness is 
assumed to be. In this theory there can be multiple discrepancies; among other things 
discrepancies between what one has and what one thinks that one could have, and 
discrepancies between what one has and what one feels entitled to (Michalos 1985). 
Perceptions of what one could have and what would be fair to have are seen to be drawn 
from social comparison. In this view, happiness is a matter of keeping up with the 
Jones’s; we feel well if we do better and bad if we do worse than those we compare 
ourselves to.  
In this theory there is little hope for achieving greater happiness for a greater 
number, since improving the living conditions for all will also improve the life of the 
Jones’s, leaving the relative differences as before. Social comparison is one of the 
mechanisms in the idea that we are on a ‘hedonic treadmill’ that presumably nullifies all 
progress (Brickman & Campbell 1971) and it is the main mechanism in Easterlin’s 
(1974) theory that economic growth does not add to happiness. In this view we can at 
best mitigate the effects of social comparison somewhat if we make the differences less 
visible. In this line Frank (1999) has advised that conspicuous consumption should be 
discouraged with heavy taxes on luxury goods and Layard (2005) recommends taxing 
high incomes more. Limiting advertisement is also suggested in this context, in particular 
commercials that use pictures of a life that is out of reach of the common man. 
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Theoretical plausibility 
There are several problems with this psychological theory. First it is clear that social 
comparison does not apply to all subjective appraisals. When I hit my finger with a 
hammer, I feel pain and my finger does not hurt less if my neighbor Jones does the same 
thing. When appraising our situation, we use various sources of information, and social 
comparison is only one of these. 
This brings us to the question of what value social comparison could be for 
assessing how well one lives. Obviously, that value is limited to aspects of life where 
social comparison is possible, such as your income, but not to less visible aspects such 
your sex life or the pleasure you take from watching a sunset. Even where we can 
measure up to the Jones this evidently informs us about what is possible in life, but not 
necessarily about what is desirable or enjoyable. Looking over the fence of my neighbor 
Jones I can see that I lag behind in the number of beer cans emptied, but this does not tell 
me whether I would be better off if I drank more. Advocates of social comparison theory 
would retort that we compare only on things that are socially valued in society, such as 
money and fame, and this links up with the assumption that notions of the good life are 
socially constructed. Yet even if beer boozing were highly valued in my society, and if I 
wholeheartedly supported that value, I would end up less well if I drank more than my 
dipsomaniacal neighbor Jones. That is evident because drinking too much is bad for the 
body, irrespective of how I think about this.  
This example illustrates a major flaw in comparison theory: it forgets that we are 
biological organisms. Obviously we cannot feel well if our body is harmed. Affective 
alarms start to ring when we do not get enough food or when our temperature falls too 
low. Less obvious, but no less present are psychological needs, such as the need to belong 
and to use and develop our potentials. We feel lousy when lonely and bored when 
unchallenged. Humans are not born as tabula rasa, on which socialization imprints culture 
specific wants, we are pre-wired to need some things and as a result feel good when these 
needs are met.  
In this respect we are very much like our fellow animals. Dogs and cats can also 
feel good or bad and evidently do not calculate their happiness by comparing shared 
standards of the good life. Evolution has simply programmed them to feel good or bad 
subjectively in situations that are good or bad for their survival objectively. Our affective 
system is not much different from that of dogs and cats, and also serves to make us do 
intuitively what is good for us. Human cognition has developed on top of this affective 
program and allows us to reflect on affective signals and even to ignore them to some 
extent. Yet this is not to say that cognition has replaced affective experience. Without 
affective information we are conatively blind as Damasio (1994) has showed in his 
studies of brain injuries. Hence without affective information we will also be unable to 
appraise the quality of our life. 
I have discussed this alternative ‘need theory’4 of happiness elsewhere 
(Veenhoven 1995, 2000) and Ed Diener has reviewed the strong and weak points of this 
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view (Diener et. al. 2000). Though alien to mainstream sociology, this latter view on 
happiness would fit socio-biology; however, to my knowledge this field of sociology has 
not yet considered the issue. 
 
Fit with facts 
Social comparison is at best one piece of information in appraisals of happiness and it is 
an empirical question how much it matters. We can see how much when considering 
some implications of the theory. 
 One testable implication of social comparison theory is that people will typically 
be neither positive nor negative about their life. If we feel good because we do better than 
the Jones, the Jones must feel bad because they do not so well. This must manifest in an 
average around neutral in general population samples. Yet survey data do not support this 
prediction, average happiness being far above neutral in modern nations. 
 Another implication is that happiness must be higher among people who do well 
on socially valued standards. This is not always the case however. Though people in high 
status jobs are typically happier than people in low status occupations, there is no 
correlation between happiness and level of education. Likewise, there is only modest 
correlation between happiness and income and this correlation is at least partly due to an 
effect of the former on the latter, happiness adding to earning chances. See respectively 
correlational findings on happiness and Occupation (section O1) Education (section E 1) 
and Income (section I1) in WDH 2007.  
 However, happiness does appear to depend on things that have little to do with 
social comparison, such as participation in voluntary organizations, intimate ties and 
being an extraverted and conscientious person. See respectively findings on happiness 
and Social participation (section S7), Friendship (section F6 ), Marriage (section M2 and 
Personality (section P4) in WDH 2007.  
 
 
4  CONCLUSION 
 
Happiness is a neglected subject in sociology. The main reason seems to be that common 
sociological theories continue to prevent us taking a proper perspective on the matter 
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Figure 1 
Life-satisfaction in EU 1999 
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Data: World Values Survey in: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden5
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Figure 2 
Average happiness in 90 nations around 2000 
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Data: World Database of Happiness, section Happiness in Nations, Rank Report 2007-1 
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Figure 3 
Trend average happiness in 8 EU nations and the USA, 1973-2003 
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Data: World Database of Happiness (WDH 2007), Data file Trends in Nations 
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Figure 4 
Trend inequality of happiness in 8 EU nations and the USA, 1973-2003 
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Data: World Database of Happiness (WDH 2007), Data file Trends in Nations 
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Figure 5 
Average happiness and modernity in nations in 2000 
 
 
 
 
Data: World Database of Happiness (WDH 2007), Data file States of Nations 
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Figure 6 
Use of terms ‘Happiness’ or ‘life-satisfaction’ in Sociological Abstracts 
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NOTES 
 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 16th World Congress of Sociology 
    Working Group 06 Social Indicators, Durban, South Africa, 23-29 July 2006. I thank Piet Ouweneel for his 
     analysis of happiness in the Sociological Abstracts. 
 
2   Analysis of 100 abstracts using the word ‘satisfaction in the period 2005 to September 2006. Half these 
    abstracts used the term in a neutral way. 
 
3   A similar preoccupation with negative things exists in psychology. Recently that has given rise to a 
    counter-movement called ‘positive psychology’.  A comparable movement has not developed in sociology 
    as yet. 
  
4  Need theory of happiness is also named ‘livability theory’ and in this case the emphasis is on the 
   conditions that allow need gratification 
 
5  Scores weighted by number of inhabitants 
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